Summary
This report covers key issues arising from the recently concluded war. It begins by examining current political prospects, and then moves on to a sketch of the last two months of the war primarily from the standpoint of civilians. While being frank about the LTTE’s cynical use of civilians, the report raises questions about the Government’s relentless move to crush the LTTE leadership while placing the civilians it held hostage at unacceptable risk. It examines humanitarian and human rights issues, the detention of the doctors who served with courage in the No-Fire-Zone, questions about the fate of the injured left behind and moral questions arising from the action against the LTTE leadership and the fate of Prabhakaran’s family. The report closes with a warning, noting the danger posed by the present government behaving increasingly like a replica of the LTTE, and makes some recommendations that UTHR(J) believes would be profitable at this juncture. The report and its recommendations emphasize two aspects in particular: the need for urgent measures to address the concerns of the recently displaced living in camps and to secure accountability of the state to ensure the due rights of its citizens.
0. Introduction
The war ended officially on 20th May 2009 in a final flourish of brutality by both sides where almost the entire LTTE leadership was killed, much as the JVP leadership was decimated in 1989. As then, the hypocrisy and the attendant brutality remained after the conflict ended, leaving the gates open for future schism. Human rights had in the late 1980s been a game of politicians who used it to beat the UNP government with. At the same time these politicians were working with the security forces to deal with the JVP’s murderous rampage extra-judicially. The extra-judicial culture has again grown acute in recent times, with the present government feeling no qualms about killing someone for their views – indeed a ‘home grown’ substitute for the rule of law.
For the nearly 300 000 people held in internment like camps, the end of the war has not brought about the respite they deserve. They continue to suffer in squalid conditions of camps made not to last more than a few weeks. Living conditions including families packed into tents and the deteriorating hygienic conditions from the lack of proper sewage to garbage disposal are leading to further disease and suffering. These displaced peoples who had suffered much under the LTTE do not deserve to be held in these conditions. The Government in restricting people the choice of movement out of the camps is responsible for their suffering. While the screening should be much quicker, there is no justification for detaining those who are clearly not combatants.
Nurtured amidst appalling human rights violations by the Sri Lankan state from 1977, the Tamil militant movements made a virtue of impunity. The upshot was the LTTE whose astounding military success was founded on despoiling the social fabric of the Tamils and making everything, from child bearing to education, creatures of its military needs.
The LTTE politically took Tamil society hostage from the mid-1980s through systematic terror. Militarily stymied, it took physical hostage of 300 000 people in its final stages, repeatedly provoking the Army to underpin its claims of genocide, shooting or shelling hundreds who tried to escape and forcing thousands of their children who could barely carry a rifle to man the frontlines. Even as the LTTE leaders were discussing surrender terms, they were sending out very young suicide cadres to ‘martyrdom’ to slow down the army advance.
Through repeated abuse of peace processes to strengthen its war machine, the LTTE again and again resuscitated the Sinhalese majoritarian agenda which had lay dormant when peace seemed possible. Such provocative action during the last peace process enabled President Rajapakse to come to power backed by hawkish allies intent on a military solution to the ethnic problem.
In turn, it is ironic to see the Sinhalese polity is being taken hostage by the very elements of Sinhalese extremism that fuelled and exacerbated the conflict in the first place. These elements within and outside the major parliamentary parties have derailed every attempt at a political settlement since 1957. The present government too has relied on Sinhalese narrow nationalism, within the state and judicial apparatus and without it, to undermine any authentic investigation demanded by world opinion into major human rights violations and political crimes. The same abusive response is in evidence as the government attempts to defend itself against worldwide criticism of the way military operations were conducted in the last stages of the conflict.
Sections of the Tamil Diaspora blindly supported the LTTE’s terror at home and its political articulation of people as weapons of mass suicide. In turn they became accomplices in extending its dreadful fiat over the Tamil social and political space within Western democracies. Without batting an eyelid, this same Diaspora is using human rights campaigns to challenge the Lankan government. They enhanced the legitimate stories of profound suffering of their people with well-publicised lies that the people were staying with the LTTE willingly, all the while denying as always its abuse of children and blaming the Government squarely for all their ills.
While challenging the majoritarian exclusivism of the State as the primal cause of the violent ethnic conflict, the UTHR(J) were among those who saw with alarm that in resisting the State, the Tamils had become prisoner of a deadly fascistic dispensation. The transition to armed struggle from parliamentary nationalism exposed the weakness of our society and the futility of politics which relied on nationalist rhetoric that equated dissent with treachery. Those who tried to charter a broader and clearer vision were soon isolated and marginalised. The UTHR(J) were convinced from the start that failing to challenge this nihilistic trend would achieve nothing but debilitation and polarization that would lend legitimacy to the Sinhalese chauvinistic agenda. Our colleague Dr. Rajani Thiranagama felt this very keenly and wrote these prophetic words in the Broken Palmyra exactly 21 years ago and paid for her convictions with her life:
“The Tigers’ history, their theoretical vacuum, lack of political creativity, intolerance and fanatical dedication will be the ultimate cause of their own break up. The legendary Tigers will go to their demise with their legends smeared with the blood and tears of victims of their own misdoings. A new Tiger will not emerge from their ashes. 0nly by breaking with this whole history and its dominant ideology, can a new liberating outlook be born.”
That demise having come to pass there is real concern that the politics of the South will become preoccupied with the Sinhalese majoritarian agenda. That would undermine any meaningful course of reconciliation and restoration of human dignity. Obscurantist statements by the Defence Secretary and Army Commander with a strong hint of menace exhibit this danger very clearly. On the eve of victory celebrations on 3rd June 2009, senior journalist Poddala Jayantha who was previously threatened by the Defence Secretary was attacked and injured in the now familiar fashion: ‘Those who love us do what is required. We cannot help that’, Sunday Times 1st Jun.08.
Addressing past violations, reforming the state, and bringing to an end the culture of impunity are imperative if the country is to move forward towards a stable and dignified peace.The demand from sections of the international community for an international inquiry is being used by the State to whip up xenophobic emotions which may undermine any genuine peace process and entrench Sinhalese nationalist ideology that is detrimental to the country. The handling of the ACF case and impunity enjoyed by those who were involved in extrajudicial killings show the present government is steering the country along the beaten track to disaster.
The failure of the international community to rein in the LTTE once it was clear that it had doomed the 2002 peace process, gave the Rajapakse government the political pretext to ignore their warnings and prosecute the war relentlessly with the objective of wiping out the LTTE leadership. They succeeded and kept out the international community even when it offered opportunities to minimise harm to the civilians. Our examination of events suggests that by normal military standards, the soldiers in close encounters behaved exemplarily towards civilians. But needless and at times tremendous harm was done by political decisions of the High Command to take the No-Fire-Zone using artillery barrages at a time when the LTTE was relying increasingly on children. It was callous not to give opportunity for diplomatic alternatives that could have achieved the same result.
The destruction of the core of the LTTE has been achieved, but many legal and moral questions remain. One group of questions concerns the political decisions mentioned above. The other concerns what appears to be the politically ordered massacre of people who wanted to surrender or surrendered; the fate of their families and LTTE injured left behind; and the question of what happened to Prabhakaran’s wife, and the 12-year-old son, whom all accounts from army sources claim was captured. It is not so much a case of what the LTTE did to the people, but what the State became through its own excesses in the course of fighting it.
Against this legacy, those in power are using the victory (for which they owe the subaltern dead) to build for themselves citadels of power and glory. And they attempt to reinforce that power by appealing to Sinhalese ideology. Now with the war over, they are calling for a huge army, one assumes to keep the minorities under check and also to maintain the prominent role of the military in the affairs of the country. Lost opportunities have become the bane of Lanka. The righteous society the President seeks to build cannot be built on pure rhetoric and manipulative politics. It can be done only if the leadership thinks beyond their power ambitions towards the well being of the people.
The President’s victory speech in Parliament on 19th May while carrying some good sentiments in a nebulous way, left little room for optimism. He again spoke of a home grown solution to the country’s ethnic impasse, said nothing about how he understood the problem and how he would approach it, except to play to the xenophobic gallery by repudiating ‘imported solutions’. One cannot begin without acknowledging that the home grown idea of Sinhalese-Buddhist hegemony has always stood in the way of any solution, was the principal cause of the bloody anarchy we faced and needs to be explicitly repudiated. The need for reconciliation was missing from his speech.
All peoples and nations share a common fund of experience and a common history. ‘Home grown’ has in the tenure of this government served as populist rhetoric to mask what is really just evasion of responsibility, arrogance and a refusal to understand. Except for those blinded by their narrow vision, all that we have seen of home grown ideas in the last six decades is homicidal ignorance: communal violence rooted in majoritarian ideology, based in turn on third rate history, and a total erosion of standards.
In his speech, the President thought it a brilliant stroke to abolish the word ‘minority’ from the vocabulary and make everyone equal, as if all it took were a royal proclamation. Along with this he recognized only two kinds of people, those who love their motherland and those who do not, the latter being the lesser. The problem with that, of course is whose idea of a motherland prevails? These sentiments in the speech reflect those who hold to the Sinhalese-Buddhist hegemonic view. This hegemonic rhetoric about motherland accompanied by anti-Tamil violence led to its Tamil version, which at that historical juncture most Tamils believed was forced on them. Thousands of Tamil youth fought in several groups and willingly gave their life, not because they did not love their country fervently, but because they believed their country was Tamil Eelam. They include the majority of LTTE cadres who have died.
Even if one rejects the LTTE leadership as totalitarian, barbaric and utterly self-indulgent, one cannot dismiss the cadres both in the LTTE and from other groups as “terrorists” and traitors against Lanka. The lesson for those of us living is that however much it took hold of us at that time, nationalist rhetoric contained within it the seeds of war, a terrible waste of lives and totalitarianism. We must honour the dead, both militants and soldiers, with a heavy sense of responsibility. In order that the honour we give them are no mere empty words, we have to feel where we all went wrong and do what is needful to prevent a repetition.
The only way those Tamil families and communities that have lost loved ones can find meaning in their loss and begin to think about a future as part of Lanka is if they as a people are granted equality and dignity through a just political process. Making them feel Lankan will be hard work, and the President seems to lack that sensitivity. It comes from his ideological make up and inability to understand the structural problems entailed by the character of state, and as a result the insecurity felt by the minorities.
Discrimination in Action: No sooner the President abolished the term minority, some old discriminatory habits which caused the Tamils to rebel show signs of returning with a vengeance. ‘Sinhalese’ fishermen have been brought under naval protection to fish in the sea off Mannar Island without any restriction. The local Tamil and Muslim fishermen are allowed only about four days a week on the pretext of security for some minor naval movements. The trawlers with Sinhalese fishermen use large Japanese nets of a kind now banned internationally, which drag the seabed, pulling out coral, the nets of local fishermen and damaging the breeding ground, eggs, weeds and fish fodder.
On 28th May the Tamil fishermen protested and had an argument with a group of Sinhalese trawler fishermen, who using the communication set the Navy provided, informed them of the boat number. When the Tamil fishermen came ashore, naval men who were waiting for them with batons, made the Tamils kneel and beat them up severely.
At this time when the official narrative dismisses the insurgency as one of Tamil terrorism backed up by international conspiracies, we must re-emphasise that the Tamil rebellion was the result of the leering loutishness of a Sinhalese dominated State that tried to deal with the minorities by the use of feudal thuggery (best exemplified by repeated outbreaks of communal violence) and persistent deprivation and humiliation. Over decades, none of that has been effectively redressed.
There is always hope amidst despair. Ordinary Sinhalese people from all walks of life felt the pain of Tamil civilians caught up in the conflict. Even from the border villages, Sinhalese who suffered grievous violence over many years have donated whatever they could lay their hands on for collections for the relief of Tamil IDPs. Even many middle class Sinhalese feel that time has come for reconciliation and initiatives to give new life to the country. They look to a broader political settlement that gives dignity to the minorities. Instead of building on this potential, the leaders are again failing the country through their preoccupation with a witch hunt and entrenching abuse of authority, while further subverting accountability.
“On the road we saw a few bodies. No one buries them anymore. This has resulted in the whole area being permeated by a putrid stench. When someone dies or is killed, people are only looking for food to be taken, but do not bury the victim. From our new location, where we just moved in, the water source is some distance away. When I attempted to fetch water early this morning, I had to race back to our bunker upon hearing the ominous boom of cannon and soon shells began falling around. It doesn’t bother me too much anymore. It has become normal that you could die any moment and anyway the food situation is so bad that some were dying from starvation. In desperation, resulting from shelling, food scarcity and total misery some people felt it was better to walk out of the safe zone although you know the LTTE is shooting people who attempt it, besides, it is extremely dangerous.” (15th May 2009)
This was among the last desperate messages out of the cruelly farcical safe zone, as the violence reached its final stages. To many Tamils, this would evoke memories of a generation of war that nearly everyone has experienced to some degree, but never so severe, prolonged and so devastatingly apocalyptic. Previously survivors rebuilt their lives in a matter of a few months. The challenge this time looks almost insuperable for those nursing their crippled bodies and haunted memories in prison camps after being hostages shelled within the LTTE’s shrinking defences. The war itself increasingly became one of the Government against Tamil children the LTTE placed on the frontlines.
It was to be an end with relieving features, but sadly also encapsulating the lies, murder and treachery that would haunt the country for years to come. The civilians who had not escaped in the three days following the entry of the troops into the northern half of the No Fire Zone (NFZ) on 19th April, were confined to 1½ miles between Vellaimullivaykkal to the north and Vattavaikkal to the south near Mullaitivu town in the southern half of the eight mile strip that formed the original NFZ. The Army commenced operations to capture the truncated NFZ following a barrage of shelling on the night of 9th May. The LTTE had placed the civilians in the middle of the strip to prevent their escape. This enabled the 53rd and 58th Divisions to commence on 13th May a southward movement along respectively the western (lagoon-ward) and eastern (sea-ward) shores of the strip. The purpose was to link up with the 59th Division advancing northwards from Mullaitivu.
These manoeuvres enabled according to the Army 4000 civilians to cross over to their lines in all directions on the 14th and also opened a gap for civilians to escape south towards the 59th Division. By the 13th evening the exit polls had indicated that the Congress was returning to power in India and any hope of a reprieve for the LTTE from that quarter was closed. The only hope for it was to surrender or break out. From available reports, there were at least two plans being considered. One to negotiate a surrender where the key leaders would be allowed out of the country and the second which came through state intelligence sources that in some respects matches the plan reported by D.B.S. Jeyaraj [1] .
The second plan was for a group of key LTTE leaders, their families and experienced fighters, numbering about 200, to cross Nanthikadal and break out west into the jungle and operate from there, for the political cadres to move into IDP camps and for a third group exempted from the first to surrender. According to this intelligence source, the selection was made by Pottu Amman of persons close to him and some key persons exempted from the select group were angry, crossed with civilians, surrendered to the Army and made this known. An important person reportedly left out was Lawrence, a key military commander in the operation to take Thenmaratchy after the success at Elephant Pass in 2000 (see Bulletin No.24) and was also a deputy of Theepan at the Anandapuram disaster in March 2009. Our source believes that he fell into the Army’s hands and was killed. Given the risks involved, the first plan may have been preferred over the second if feasible.
The talk of surrender in the air had also a disturbing effect on young cadres who had come to believe that the movement would never contemplate such a course after making so many commit suicide for its sacred cause. Among those who had cause for bitter complaint were parents who had lost a child or more who died fighting as conscripts. Because of disorganization during the latter period not all cadres had cyanide capsules. According to those who later escaped, a number of LTTE cadres began committing suicide by exploding grenades in their possession. There was a kind of anarchy. Some cadres were going to bunkers where civilians were sheltering, asking “So you want to run away to the Army do you?”, and then opening fire at them. It would also explain why Intelligence Chief Pottu Amman made his selection with care.
Following the shelling on Saturday 9th May, the people who were used as a civilian shield in the shrunken NFZ were desperate to get out, as were the Tigers to prevent them. We relate the story as told by a family in a large group of an estimated 60 000, who in the desperation of their plight, decided to make the journey across the Nanthikadal lagoon. Herded together, they trekked north along the coast of the lagoon towards a point in the NFZ where the crossing was shallower.
A group of LTTE cadres moved into the crowd cutting it in two and started firing and chasing back south the section of the crowd that came behind. The section at the front ran forward along the lagoon coast towards the intended crossing point.
Having driven back one section, the LTTE shelled the lagoon beach where those who moved forward were gathered for the crossing. Many of the civilians perished.
Even at this point the depth being about six feet is above the heads of adults and the distance to the farther end, about 3 miles. Even when in the earlier phase, before 22nd April, the crossing was made on foot across the lagoon at Puthumattalan, eye-witnesses reported that many who under the pressure of the situation failed to keep to the narrow line where the depth was only chest high perished by drowning. Nanthikadal lagoon which lies to the south of Puthumattalan, is wider and shallower northward. Some in the crowd who are from that area and owned fishing boats also had rubber vehicle tubes that they used as dinghies to carry the aged, the ladies and the children with the rest swimming or supporting themselves by clinging to the dinghies.
In the case of the vast majority of the crowd, their able bodied men had to swim across to the other end (Vattuvan), find dinghies abandoned by their owners who had previously escaped, and swim back with them and then use them to carry and guide their families to safety. The Army at the other end, came to the shore realising what the civilians were trying to do, lent support by inflating and keeping ready at their end their own vehicle tubes for the men to take back. Many among the people – especially children and women – perished as a result of dinghies capsizing.
About this time, another youth set off with 12 others to the coast of Nanthikadal. They had not had any food other than an occasional cup of tea and biscuits for the past ten days. Along their trek they wearily sat down under a tree. A shell from the LTTE suddenly struck them and killed all the other 12. Shocked and weary, the youth ran desperately, plunged into the lagoon and began wading. Soon finding the water above the level of his head, he frantically began to swim. He was not a good swimmer and was already very weak. When he thought he would perish, he spotted a plastic water can floating towards him and was saved by it.
While the fighting went on it is clear that negotiations were also under way. Once the Army entered the NFZ, gun battles raged between the two sides. The civilians were anxiously cringing in available bunkers, or in their tents. No information is available from the data gleaned by our sources as to the extent of civilian casualties in this phase. To avoid being caught up in the fighting the civilians at the northern and southern ends were anxious to escape. According to the civilians who escaped, the LTTE deployed suicide cadres in plenty to stop the army advance. The Army reported an attempt to ram the 58th Division by four cadres driving an explosive-laden truck, which exploded prematurely. The civilians said that the Army took many casualties, but refrained from harming the civilians, and in fact physically helped them to get across.
At the beginning of the operation the Army had used some shells which resulted in some civilian casualties. However, the IDPs are uniformly emphatic that the Army shelled only in reply to the militants’ mortar and gun fire from among the civilians.
There was something else that started happening on the 15th morning that pointed to a deal. The pro-LTTE TamilNet reported the safe zone in smoke from army-shelling and huge civilian casualties. At one point in this scenario, the militants decided to pile up all their weaponry, ammunition and vehicles and make a huge bonfire. This huge flame rising into the clouds was what had been shown in many television channels around the globe. The explosive heat, according to eye-witnesses, resulted in death and searing burns to many as their IDP tents caught fire.
When the civilians tried to run away from the zone, they were confronted by the LTTE who threatened to shoot them. They went back and attempted escape again and were again turned back by the LTTE. They tried the third time. This time the LTTE cadres who had cordoned them off previously had vanished, leaving them free to escape.
The message soon got around that the LTTE which had held the civilians hostage, had let them go. The doctors also left as the TamilNet reported the following day (16th): “Medical Superintendent Dr. Shanmugarajah who was attending the wounded at the makeshift hospital at Mullivaykkal junior school, his family, Regional Director of Health Services (RDHS) doctors, Dr Varatharajah and Dr Sathiyamoorthy, and three other doctors have entered the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) controlled checkpoint at Omanthai. Dr Varatharajah has been seriously wounded during his passage out of the Safety Zone, and reports from Vanni say, he has been air-lifted for medical treatment.” It also reported the departure of Additional Government Agent K. Parthipan, effectively closing down the government administration in the area.
Another indication that a deal had been made is a statement by the LTTE’s global plenipotentiary Pathmanathan alias KP issued later on 15th May and reported on TamilNet: “The Sinhala people have a duty and responsibility in stopping [the ongoing carnage and bloodbath], considering their own interest if not that of the Tamils. The Sinhala people should not forget that we are always going to be neighbours in the island.”
Civilians also said that on Friday 15th the Army stopped shelling after the LTTE began destroying its paraphernalia. Piecing together the events and scraps of information, we may describe the outlines of the deal: The Government would accept the surrender of the remaining LTTE personnel and leaders, with due consideration to prevailing norms of surrender, and allow a certain number of leaders to leave the country, the conditions being: 1.) Surrender of Weapons and equipment, 2.) Release of Civilians and 3.) Release of prisoners from the government forces the LTTE held.
The LTTE agreed to destroy its weapons and equipment instead of surrendering them, and apparently this was agreed. On Friday 15th it began complying with 1.) & 2.). It also complied with 3.) as would be seen. According to our information three TNA MPs, including Chandra Nehru Jr., were among those involved in making these arrangements.
Sea Tiger Chief Soosai on the morning of the 15th when a coastal strip was still accessible to the LTTE, sent his five members of his family out to sea in a boat with six others. His family were his wife Sathyadevi, daughter Mathi (17) and son Suresh (16). There was no chance of their evading the Navy. There was speculation that their task was to surrender to the Navy and to pass on messages about surrender issues.
Early in the morning Prabhakaran as reported by Marie Colvin [2] (Timesonline, 17. 05.09), told an overseas contact to arrange for an end to the fighting, but not to use the term surrender. The LTTE leaders had started keeping their side of the bargain as understood by them and were anxious about the Government keeping its. While destroying their weapons, they passed desperate messages to the international community and the ICRC calling for their intervention citing continued shelling, the presence of civilians and the thousands wounded in need of medical care. Pathmanathan in a statement referred to US President Obama’s call for both sides to take immediate measures to alleviate the humanitarian tragedy and said, “The LTTE and is willing to heed to his call…Our people are now at the mercy of the international community.”
The Defence Ministry reported a battle fought at close quarters when the 58th Division closed in on the last half a mile of coastal strip controlled by the LTTE killing 32 cadres, including leaders Sornam and Sashikumar, and completed the encirclement of the LTTE. According to persons who were present, civilians were not much affected by the fighting on the 16th.
In the early hours of the morning the LTTE cadres guarding the seven servicemen (4 sailors and 3 soldiers) held prisoner let them walk away reportedly on the understanding that they would help them to surrender.
The LTTE leaders were probably becoming impatient that while they were being systematically surrounded, nothing had been heard on arrangements for their surrender. A decision was evidently made to put the second plan into action. The Army reported what was apparently a last attempt on the part of a section of the LTTE to break through army lines and flee westwards into the jungle. Cadres crossed the Nanthikadal Lagoon in several boats about 1.30 AM and attacked the army line beyond the western shore of the lagoon. The attempt ostensibly failed with the loss of scores of cadres after hours of fighting. Subsequent reports indicated that Prabhakaran and some others close to him were caught or killed in this attempt. We have no information on those, if any, who got through.
From a civilian perspective, they had continued to cross Nathikadal lagoon from Vellaimullivaykkal into Vattuvan. At Vattuvan they had to wait for army clearance to move on. The army positions were one mile west inshore. The civilian movement may also have enabled the LTTE to disguise their movement while crossing the lagoon. On the 17th morning the civilians waiting for clearance were surprised to find the LTTE among them. The LTTE ordered the civilians to disperse elsewhere, went forward to confront the Army. The civilians heard a tremendous exchange of fire with the Army. They think some civilians who were too close may have fallen victim to cross fire. The civilians do not know much else and cannot confirm the presence of senior leaders.
In a statement Pathmanathan issued about noon saying ‘This battle has reached its bitter end’, he faulted the international community’s inaction, “…we have appealed to the countries of the world and called on them to halt the unrelenting massacre of our people by the Sri Lankan armed machinery. We are extremely saddened that this plea has fallen on deaf ears.” He announced, “We have decided to silence our guns…In the face of the current conditions, we will no longer permit this battle to be used as a justification by the forces of the Sinhala state to kill our people. We willingly stand up with courage and silence our guns. We have no other option other than to continue our plea to the international community to save our people.” This was followed immediately by a broadcast statement by Sea Tiger Leader Soosai speaking of continuing artillery attacks, thousands in need of evacuation and the unresponsiveness of the ICRC.
By mid-day thus on the 17th, as Pathmanathan’s statement indicates, the LTTE had in effect decided to surrender, come what may. There is little doubt that a deal had been made, in accordance with which the LTTE had let the people go, destroyed most of its heavy weaponry and released detainees from the security forces unharmed. The troops were moving in their vicinity without any word about accepting surrender and the LTTE remnants had little choice but to fight to death.
Two official announcements were made that afternoon, which were ominous for the civilians remaining in the NFZ. About noon Military Spokesman Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara announced that‘troops have rescued all remaining civilians held hostage by LTTE terrorists’ and that 50,000 civilians were rescued during last 72 hours. The second announcement that President Rajapakse would make a victory speech in Parliament on Tuesday 19th morning effectively set a political timetable. The first implied that the Army would not exercise the same caution over the civilian presence. The announcement notwithstanding, the final evacuation of 29 000 the following day pointed to over 30 000 civilians having remained.
Desperate attempts to surrender by Nadesan and Pulidevan of the LTTE’s political wing have been documented by Andrew Buncombe [3] in the Independent (19th May 09) and by Marie Colvin[4] in Timesonline (24th May 09). They involved contacts between the LTTE’s international support group, Chandra Nehru Jr. MP, the UN, ICRC, Norway’s Environment Minister Eric Solheim and from the Government, President Rajapakse, his brother Basil and Secretary to the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Palitha Kohona. It was agreed that they would be safe if they hoisted a white flag, walked towards the Army and surrendered. Nadesan had said he had 300 people with him, some of them injured. Other Tamil political party sources said that Nadesan and Pulidevan appealed to nearly all those in politics who had once been on the LTTE’s hit list.
Marie Colvin had personally spoken to the UN Secretary General’s envoy Vijay Nambiar, whom the two prospective surrendees requested to be present to witness the surrender. He told Colvin that it would not be necessary as the President’s assurances were enough. Chandra Nehru later told Colvin that upon his contacting President Rajapakse he had guaranteed the safety of Nadesan and his family. These were repeated by his brother Basil who also gave the route they should follow. After speaking to Chandra Nehru about 6.20 AM on the 18th, the party went with a white flag in a group of about a dozen men and women. Colvin quoted a source, who said, the army started firing machineguns at them. Nadesan’s wife, a Sinhalese, yelled in Sinhalese at the soldiers: “He is trying to surrender and you are shooting him.” She was also shot down. All in the group were reportedly killed.
Kohona told the Independent that he had been told by troops present at the time that they understood the two men had been shot by LTTE cadres who learned of their attempt to escape, adding that ‘this is consistent with their behaviour’. The same day the Daily Mirror quoted him pointing otherwise: “The LTTE wanted to surrender their arms a little too late”. This summary action also suggests the Government having decided that it had nothing useful to learn (e.g. about Prabhakaran) from those killed.
The official Defence Ministry web site defence.lk reported in two separate items finding in the morning during mopping up operations the bodies of Nadesan, Pulidevan and Ramesh in one and the LTTE leader’s eldest son Charles Anthony in the other. It said vaguelyof Charles Anthony that ‘the body was found after an unsuccessful and half-hearted attempt by the LTTE cadres to evacuate their leader’s son early this morning.’
The fighting became heavy as the Army closed in. Civilians going westward across the lagoon from Vellaimullivaykkal on the 18th morning confirmed this and they saw dead and injured in the area. Some other civilians who left that day were in bunkers and the atmosphere became smoky causing nausea and vomitishness. Amidst this they saw an army truck from which the soldiers were beckoning them to come and get in. Many of them got in and were taken away and transported to camps. They saw many bodies and said the wounded were left behind and do not know what became of them.
With the prospect of surrender denied, the remaining LTTE cadres had little choice but to fight as they did on the morning of 18th May. The following story from the Army carried in the Daily Mirror of 19th May (slightly edited) is the first of the constantly changing official versions of what happened on the 18th morning:
“A group of nearly 100 LTTE cadres believed to include LTTE leader Prabhakaran and senior leaders including intelligence chief Pottu Amman and Soosai infiltrated the army’s forward defence line and reportedly attacked the ambulance. The driver and two critically injured soldiers however managed to escape. Later, some of the LTTE leaders reportedly got into the ambulance and attempted to escape through Puthukudiyirruppu. The Special Forces attacked the ambulance which caught fire. A fierce gun battle lasting over an hour resulted in more than 250 bodies of LTTE cadres lying scattered. The Defence Establishment believed that all top LTTE leaders, including Prabhakaran, were killed during the abortive escape attempt on the 18th morning.”
The story about the leaders trying to escape in an ambulance was dropped the next day. The defence columns of the following Sunday carried the uniform version, that Pulidevan and Nadesan who attempted to surrender, died allegedly in the fighting described above. This clumsy attempt at lying creates the suspicion that many of the cadres killed that morning were massacred like those with Nadesan and Pulidevan.
The number killed was later placed by the Defence Ministry at above 350 and its pictorial evidence showed corpses, some with burn marks. The Defence Ministry has not said what it did with the injured and prisoners. Claims of a massacre have been emanating from the security forces from the same day. These were messages from very senior officers, middle ranking officers and personnel. They were posted in various areas. Some heard it from friends on the scene and others from the armed forces grapevine. The common substance was the same: All LTTE members who were left there were massacred, including the women and children. The few who survived are Soosai’s family and their company who surrendered to the Navy on the 15th and George Master and Daya Master who surrendered to the Army in April.
We try to piece together the truth from the testimony of civilian sources. The night of the 17th saw heavy fighting going on into the 18th morning. Some reliable witnesses and other IDPs who were present when the Army entered are certain that a large number, perhaps the majority, of those killed in the NFZ during the last 12 hours were killed by LTTE shelling. Shells were falling into them and from the direction they are certain that they were fired by the LTTE.
There was already a political timetable with the President due to make a victory speech in Parliament on the 19th morning. Along with this it had been announced the previous day that all civilian hostages had been freed – i.e. the 30 000 or more civilians who were there did not exist or matter. It had evidently been decided to wrap up the fighting by the 18th, whatever the civilian cost. Those present there said that the Army in trying to move into the remaining territory suffered heavy casualties. Perhaps as the result of this when they entered, they had abandoned the ‘hostage rescue mode’ and did not as before make due allowance for the civilian presence. They threw grenades into several civilian bunkers as they moved, as a precaution against the LTTE attacking them from these (as on 19th April). Some civilians also reported seeing an army truck running over injured lying on the road. A fuller picture would require months to assemble.
After the guns fell silent, the Army, according to witnesses, allowed civilians to leave and helped them to do so. They crossed the Vattuvan Bridge which the Army had repaired into Mullaitivu instead of having to brave the open lagoon. Most left, except for about 10 000. Suspecting many militants and their supporters as well as suicide bombers were ready to explode them-selves within the public, the Army fenced them in by erecting a barbed wire fence around the latest NFZ. They had then erected tall secure sentry posts with only a narrow hole for the eyes.
Civilians then had to walk out one at a time, stripped, to these posts. The ladies walked out with only their under clothing. Our source did not inquire as to whether female personnel were used for the examination of women.
When the Army entered, there was a mass of dead bodies, some stinking after lying there for two days or more. They used earth moving equipment to dig up and then bury these bodies in mass graves. The last day was the murkiest and our sources place the number of civilians killed higher than on any previous occasion. Of the injured, the Army later transported 15 packed bus loads, of about 1400 injured civilians, to Padaviya. As we would discuss below in the section on casualty figures, this falls far below the number injured. We have no information on casualties taken to other hospitals. The Government has said nothing about the LTTE injured. Early that morning Pulidevan had told his contacts that 1000 injured cadres were with them. This was while the fighting was in progress.
Given also the fact that earth moving equipment was used to clear the area before the President’s victory announcement the following day, we need to ask if adequate care was taken to separate the dead from the injured and the dying. On the testimony of civilians there were several injured persons asking for help. They did say that the Army picked up injured persons, but their general approach was to wind things up in a hurry. Given also persistent stories of a massacre from within the Army itself, an important task of an inquiry should be to lay bare the fate of those injured in the last week and what really happened from the 17th May evening to the 18th morning when the fighting ended.
Information about Prabhakaran’s death in the public domain has been dominated by government disinformation and the LTTE’s silence. It is also of interest that no reports of conversations between Prabhakaran, who had his personal sat-phone and his overseas contacts have surfaced in the public domain after the one on the morning of Saturday 16th May seeking an end to the fighting without using the term surrender. Also in surrender talks later on the 17th May reported by Marie Colvin and Andrew Buncombe involving high level persons locally and abroad, there is no mention of Prabhakaran. Also of significance is the announcement of the President’s victory speech in the 17th afternoon.
On the night of the 17th there were reports coming from a high level within the security forces that Prabhakaran’s person or body had been brought to Colombo. This story was soon overtaken by copious material fed to the media the morning after, 18th. Finding of the bodies of Charles Anthony, Nadesan and several others was reported. The Army Commander went on state television to report, “We have also found bodies of several other LTTE leaders, and are carrying out checks to confirm whether one of the bodies is that of the LTTE leader.” Other officers filled it out and told journalists that they had fired thermo-baric weapons at the ambulance carrying allegedly Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman and Soosai, and were doing DNA tests on a charred body that looked like Prabhakaran’s. While celebrations were going on, Pathmanathan said about mid-night that the LTTE leader is alive and well.
On the morning of the 19th journalists got SMS messages that Prabhakaran’s body has been found close to the northern shore of the Nanthikadal lagoon and Karuna and Daya Master were on their way to identify it. There appeared to be a full body, but almost everything else about it was a hoax. Allegedly felled by a bullet in the head, the eyes were clear. It was on a crude stretcher; no signs of charring by a thermo-baric weapon, naked except for a black flap covering its genitals, held in place by a tape around its tummy. The chest neck and jaw were covered with superfluous mud.
The Government and the Army were at pains to explain this development and again there were contradictory stories from within the Army. One was that a soldier who was part of a search operation ran into Prabhakaran, exchanged fire with him and shot him, not knowing who he was.
Another coming from a senior officer says that Prabhakaran was a free man, alive and well on the morning of Tuesday 19th. Prabhakaran sent his younger son (12 years, b. 1st Oct. ‘96) with six body guards to surrender, thinking the soldiers wouldn’t harm the boy. They came and discovered Prabhakaran with his family. He was not certain what happened thereafter except that Prabhakaran died of a shot in the head. Despite constant reports of discovery of her person or body, the Government remained evasive about Prabhakaran’s wife Mathivathani. Brigadier Shavendra de Silva, who commanded the 58th Division told the New Indian Express (21 May.09), “We had to look for Prabhakaran’s body because the world was interested in seeing it. But the body of his wife is not of any importance to us.” That would be the fate of the unknown hundreds of civilians and militants killed in those last days.
A new version of the story fed to the Sunday papers (24th May) is no less fishy: “Prabhakaran was… apparently inside one of the six mangrove islands in the lagoon. Troops using medium calibre guns pounded the small island…Later, infantry troops [about] 10 AM in the morning…found the body of the Tiger chieftain bleeding from a yawning wound on the forehead. His bodyguards lay dead around him (Lakbimanews).” Another variant in the Nation claimed that two of Prabhakaran’s body guards who approached the Army to surrender were killed by their colleagues.
Prabhakaran: Likely Scenario
We had referred to reports that Prabhakaran was killed or captured when Tiger fighters made a desperate attempt about 1.30 AM on 17th May to get him along with some senior leaders and their families, west across the lagoon, past lines of troops from the 53rd Division, into the jungle. This was Plan 2 above. The evidence suggests that Prabhakaran was killed or captured in the attempt. Information seeping into the public domain from within the Army points to capture or surrender, but the official responses dismissing this are a rehash of stories the public no longer finds credible. It is left to an impartial inquiry to answer this and related questions.
The Army web site reported the recovery of the bodies of 70 Tigers after the breakout attempt on the 17th morning, but said nothing of Prabhakaran’s family. Reuters reported the same day, 17th, quoting a military official on condition of anonymity, “They are taking the body for checks to confirm it is the real Prabhakaran”. Four other military sources confirmed the account to Reuters. CNN-IBN too reported in addition that 150 LTTE bodies were recovered pointing to the early morning attempted break out.
Asian Tribune (7.00 PM, 17 May) placed the number of Tiger bodies collected at 35. AT quoted an army source saying Prabhakan’s wife Mathivathani and sons, Charles Anthony and Balachandran, had been killed. The report presumed daughter Dwaraka was abroad. It said that Prabhakaran’s body had been taken to an army camp in Colombo for DNA testing.
The foregoing is in accordance with what we heard coming from top level army sources. A further piece of evidence is that the next day President Rajapakse called up Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee to confirm that ‘armed resistance by the LTTE had ended and its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was dead’ (The Hindu 19.05.09). Given the leaders’ personal obsession with Prabhakaran, we may surmise that the President or his brother saw first hand evidence before contacting Mukherjee.
Pathmanathan reversing his earlier denial, by confirming on 24th May that Prabhakaran died on the 17th, adds further substance to this scenario. This makes us bold to speak of other information we received from sources that gave the core story. These sources said that Prabhakaran was tortured probably at Division 53 HQ in the presence of a Tamil government politician and a general. Several army sources have said Prabhakaran’s 12-year-old son Balachandran was killed after capture. Ours said that he was killed in front of his father. These sources added that this information is correct unless officers at the highest level are fibbing to one another. Our sources in addition to several others have said that all the LTTE persons remaining in the NFZ were massacred.
We may now piece together things that we touched on. When President Rajapakse left for the G11 Summit in Jordan on 14th May, the surrender deal with the LTTE in which TNA MPs including Chandra Nehru Jr. and several external actors was ongoing. The Government let the LTTE do its part and played for time keeping its options open. On 16th May the Army captured the last bit of coast under the LTTE and had them boxed in. The President flew back after announcing at the Summit that he will ‘return to Sri Lanka as a leader of a nation that vanquished terrorism’. Before he reached Colombo he would likely have received the news of the attempted breakout.
Rajapakse had no more use for the deal with the LTTE further weakened after the morning’s attempt. UN envoy Vijay Nambiar either lost interest or was following instructions. This is suggested by what he told Muralidhar Reddy of the Frontline (19th June) about events of the 17th May 2009:
“I received a call from KP at Amman while I was on my way to Colombo in preparation for the visit of the U.N. Secretary-General. He told me the Tigers are ready to surrender to a third party. I asked him on the whereabouts of Prabakaran and his reply was that he had no idea. I told him that I would convey to the government his message about the Tigers. I received another call from KP as soon as I landed at Colombo around 5.30 a.m. I conveyed to him that I had passed on his earlier message to the Sri Lanka government and that it was ready to accept surrender but only to the military and not to a third party. Once again I asked him on the whereabouts of Prabakaran and he repeated that he did not know anything on the subject. That was the end of the matter as far as I am concerned.”
When KP told Nambiar he did not know about Prabhakaran’s whereabouts, he was likely being truthful. Nambiar would later have heard the reports doing the rounds in Colombo. The fate of the survivors, the small fry, was sealed. We may disbelieve the Government’s stories about how various LTTE members died, if they did. Much of the drama put on by the Government was to destroy evidence and avoid adverse legal implications.
As to the fate of the women, the Defence Ministry’s web defence.lk displayed among bodies identified that of a woman named as Colonel Mekala. Her body lies beside that of another woman in what appears to be a night dress, not battle fatigues. Mekala’s picture suggests that she had been stripped and her body was covered with a blue cloth before being photographed. Some flies and some white substance in her hair could also be noticed. Some of the victims had been executed by shooting into the ear. One wonders what made the Defence Ministry take pride in displaying these pictures.
The Army had for the most part conducted itself in a disciplined manner in trying to protect civilians. But once the command gives a signal for barbarity to be let loose, the men touch the most depraved depths of humanity. That appears to have happened to some units when given the licence to brutality among prisoners of war. Several other officers and men were thoroughly disturbed.
Deal Saved Thousands held by the LTTE, Questions about the Injured
Although the surrender deal did not work from the LTTE leaders’ standpoint, it saved thousands of lives that would have been lost if shelling continued in the small area and people tried to cross the deep lagoon under fire. Had this process started earlier when the UN and other influential countries demanded the LTTE should surrender, the international community’s ability to play a constructive role would have been greater and thousands of lives would have been saved.
The surviving child conscripts got away leaving only a hard core behind. Some medical sources place the number of injured conscripts and cadres who got away with the civilians at several thousands. 15 bus loads of injured youngsters totaling about 1000, many among them child conscripts aged 12 to 14 were moved to Mannar Hospital. The youngsters are in two wards, one for boys and one for girls. It is not clear why the Government is holding them under police security where relatives cannot easily talk to them.
The local army command sometimes accused hospitals of sheltering LTTE cadres and applied pressure on them to release them for screening. In one instance a Sinhalese surgeon sent to one of these hospitals took the Army’s view that LTTE cadres were taking refuge as patients. The Medical Superintendent stood firm and refused to discharge anyone who was not fully cured. This is an area where the Government would have done well for itself by showing greater generosity and openness.
Nearly 287 000 IDPs are registered at camps at the time of writing. This suggests that the final exodus during May involved over 80 000. The larger camps are in Vavuniya and Murunkan. Some smaller camps are in Padaviya-Weli Oya (Manal Aru) and Pulmoddai. About 7000 injured are in hospital at the time of writing. The Government has said that over 7000 surrendered LTTE cadres are in rehabilitation camps.
The smaller camps in Pulmoddai and Mullaitivu District are being closed. The inmates are being moved to a large camp named Sahanagama in cleared jungle at 13th Mile Post on the Pulmoddai-Padaviya Rd. This camp is eventually expected to house 25 to 28 thousand persons. That gives the appearance of long term imprisonment far from where their relatives could have access to them.
In a press release on 18th May, the ICRC took up the question of the injured left behind in the NFZ after the effective closure of the makeshift hospital on the 15th: “For nine consecutive days the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been pursuing efforts, so far without success, to reach the area of north-eastern Sri Lanka hard hit by fighting in recent weeks.The ICRC has therefore been unable to obtain first-hand information about the needs of civilians and wounded people in the area. Although thousands of civilians have fled the conflict zone in the past days and weeks, the ICRC remains concerned about the wounded needing urgent medical care.”
After 9th May the ICRC had not been able to remove by sea injured persons to hospital in Pulmoddai, owing to the escalation of fighting in a shrunken area. According to NGO officials who were in touch with the ICRC operation, there were last about 3000 injured left in the NFZ. We have referred to the events of 18th May, when many combatants and non-combatants died or were injured. The ICRC was not allowed north of Omanthai.
We referred to the Army having moved 15 packed busloads of injured, numbering about 1400 from the NFZ to Padaviya Hospital. Witnesses who saw them said that nearly all of them had not received any first aid. There were several bad cases of shell injury where a man’s hand was hanging limply from the shoulder without any previous attention. They also said that many of the injured were young mothers with neck injuries. They held their young ones out of the bunker to urinate and were injured with their young by flying shrapnel. Sources who met the injured said that the persons brought were family folk or children and did not include cadres.
The Medical Officer at Padaviya did an excellent job with the injured before the serious cases were dispatched to better equipped hospitals in the South.
Our sources felt that there must have been over 3000 injured in the NFZ. TamilNet reported on 8th May that 500 patients were awaiting transportation by the ICRC after the last ICRC ship left. Following the artillery barrage on the night of 9th May that preceded the Army’s advance into the southern half of the original NFZ, Dr. Shanmugarajah told the international media that the number of injured increased by 1100 overnight. The 15th was another bad day. The 21st May 2009 Timesonline report quoting UN sources also placed the injured at 3000.
What became of the 3000 or so injured is not clear. A TamilNet report on 16th May quoting volunteer medics placed the number of injured in the makeshift hospital at 2000+. TamilNet in its last report of 18th May 2009 quoting the ill-fated Pulidevan reported: “Monday early hours around 3:00 a.m. Vanni local time, the LTTE Political Chief B. Nadesan and LTTE Peace Secretariat Director S. Puleedevan telephoned their contacts in Europe and informed them to tell the ICRC Head Office that only around 1,000 wounded cadres, civil officials of the LTTE and civilians remained in the so-called safety zone and there was no firing from the LTTE side. They urged the ICRC to evacuate the wounded.”
This suggests that many of those fleeing the NFZ had helped along injured relatives who were not absolutely helpless. The fighting on night of 17th May to the 18th morning as said led to a number of civilian casualties. The civilian dead on this night on the basis of information from people who were there is estimated at 1000 to 4000, which corresponds to at least 2000 injured.
One would still have expected a minimum of 3000 injured to have been in the NFZ, including 1000 cadres. The number transported by the Army to Padaviya accounts for only a section of the injured civilians left behind. As we pointed out before, the persistent reports of a massacre, the use of earth moving equipment, the hurry to wind up operations in keeping with a time table and the absence of independent observers, gives room for considerable anxiety about the fate of the injured.
The Government was so obsessed with wiping out the LTTE leadership that it did not think of halting operations for a few hours to give the ICRC an opportunity to pick up the injured suffering without medication in the NFZ. By failing to give the ICRC timely access, suspicion would remain about the fate of many injured persons, until at least an impartial group talks to and documents the fate of civilians village by village. All that we could say is that deliberate shelling by the LTTE, and the Army intent on finishing the job hurriedly without taking chances, led to a large number of civilian deaths on the final day. The fate of the injured, including LTTE cadres, needs to be resolved. The failure so far to account for LTTE prisoners and injured cadres, including those referred to in Pulidevan’s final communication, must be addressed.
One person who crossed with the civilians in the final days and surrendered to the Army is Baby Subramaniam – a member of the LTTE from 1976. The state-owned Sinhalese paper Dinaminareported that those who apparently escaped with the civilians and are now in government custody include political and administrative leaders Karikalan, Yogaratnam Yogi, Lawrance Thilakar, Elilan, B. Balakumar, Ilamparithi and Thangan. Karikalan was one time eastern political leader of the LTTE, and later was in charge of economic affairs. Yogaratnam Yogi was a political leader and spokesman of the outfit in the early 1990s. Former EROS leader V. Balakumar was an advisor, while Kannan is deputy political leader of the LTTE. Another arrested LTTE leader is Lawrence Thilakar, who was head of its Paris office.
Administrative head Puvanakkan, commissar of sports Papa, deputy internal affairs head Gnanam, Jaffna leader Ilamparithi and Trincomalee political leader Elilan are also in the custody of defence authorities.
That makes up an archive of history for researchers who want to find out more about the fate of thousands of dissidents killed by the LTTE from the late 1980s and in the gulags of the early 1990s. Or would the gentlemen above become SLFP politicians like Karuna and history disappear with it? As with Karuna, they would for now find it very hard to get genuine votes. The people in camps are cursing them for forcing their unwilling children to face death while themselves surrendering.
One wonders at the ironies, remembering that the LTTE was born in a blaze of publicity in July 1975, when SLFP politician and Jaffna Mayor Alfred Duraiappah was branded a traitor to the Tamil nation and shot dead. That birth story too remains a mystery like the end. It is not at all clear if it was Prabhakaran who fired the fatal shot as proudly acclaimed (see Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power). History may have the last laugh if the SLFP were to be the beginning and the end of the LTTE.
Insensitivity to IDP Needs:An Incident in Menic Farm Zone 4
“What if after the death of Rohana Wijeweera and the top JVP leadership, the government decided to incarcerate all residents of the areas previously under de facto JVP control (such as most of Hambantota and Moneragala districts), in order to catch a few thousand JVP operatives? What if huge ‘welfare camps’ were built and hundreds of thousands of Sinhalese were herded into them, so that the Security Forces could weed out a few thousand JVP cadres hiding amongst them? Would that not have been as illegal as hell and a moral outrage? Counterproductive too, as it would have further polarised the South, rendering impossible any reconciliation, any return to normalcy. Sri Lanka would have remained an unstable land, riven by fear, suspicion, bitterness…The men, women and children in these camps are not de jure prisoners because they have not been found guilty of or even been charged with any crime. They are de facto prisoners, whose sole ‘crime’ was living in ‘enemy territory’. The camps represent nothing less than the extra-judicial internment of almost the entire population of the Northern districts which were under Tiger control during the last phase of the war. If this is not ethnically based collective punishment, what is it?” - Tisaranee Gunasekara (Sunday Island 7 Jun.09)
The first reaction of most IDPs is relief at having got away from the LTTE and the first of their priorities is to reunite scattered families. The way the Government is dealing with the problem, many Tamil officers who were with the people are themselves in IDP camps regarded as suspects. The administration and running of camps is in the hands of the military and a largely Sinhalese officialdom. There is too much of the Sinhalese hegemonic mindset in the affair. Those outside trying to contact their relatives go to the camps in the morning and are dispersed by the military if some ministers or officials are visiting. They must return in hope another day. New regulations that would involve an elaborate pass system may for visitors make it more difficult than visiting an inmate of Welikade prison.
There are now increasing concerns as to whether there will be timely resettlement of this displaced population. While the government has stated that it plans to resettle the bulk of the displaced in six months, the conditions in the camps are such that this time frame looks gruelling for the displaced people. The lack of progress in resettlement of those who had been displaced for a few months raises skepticism about the six month deadline. The heavy monsoon rains due in a few months will further exacerbate the situation.
The government has bureaucratized procedures and made it very difficult for aid agencies and NGOs to work in this environment. In this context those helping the government with such humanitarian work are struggling with the dilemma of whether to legitimize these camps by working there or to leave them and abandon the people who are desperate for any help. The displaced people who are being subject to such collective punishment are bound to lead to further bitterness among a population that has s
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